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COMMENT
MEDICAID ELIGIBILITY PLANNING FOR AGED CLIENTS
IN VIRGINIA
I. INTRODUCTION
The Medicaid program is a jointly financed federal and state
assistance program established under Title XIX of the Social
Security Act of 1965.1 The purpose of the program is to provide
"federal financial assistance to States that choose to reimburse
certain costs of medical treatment for needy persons."2 The
Medicaid program's federal statutory and regulatory framework
was described by Justice Powell of the United States Supreme
Court as "among the most intricate ever drafted by Congress."3
Justice Powell added that the Act's "Byzantine construction...
makes [it] 'almost unintelligible to the uninitiated.' 4 To add to
these already significant difficulties, each state participating in
the program develops its own eligibility requirements and stan-
dards for coverage.5 The complexity of these federal and state
provisions, combined with the rising cost of nursing home
care,6 has led many elderly Americans to seek the help of at-
torneys in order to protect their assets and plan for Medicaid-
eligibility
1. 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 1396-1397(e) (Law. Co-op. 1995 & Supp. 1997); 42 C.F.R. §§
430-498.103 (1996).
2. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 301 (1980).
3. Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 43 (1981).
4. Id. (quoting Friedman v. Berger, 547 F.2d 724, 727 n.7 (2d Cir. 1976)).
5. See 42 U.S.C.S. § 1396a(aX17) (Law. Co-op. 1995).
6. The average annual cost of nursing home care in the United States is
$40,000. See Harris, Meyer, Egging People On, Hosp. & HEALTH NETWORKS, Oct. 20,
1996, at 34.
7. "In fact, a growing number of lawyers specialize in this.... Nearly 70 per-
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This article seeks to explain the Medicaid provisions relevant
to aged persons in Virginia and provide some basic Medicaid-
eligibility planning strategies. Part II of the article sets forth
the specific provisions applicable to aged Virginia residents.
Basic planning strategies are discussed in Part III, and changes
in these strategies resulting from recent legislative action are
discussed in Part IV.
II. MEDICAID PROGRAM PARAMETERS
A. Medicaid Coverage
Medicaid benefits cover medical expenses for aged applicants
during the month in which the individual applied for benefits if
the applicant was "eligible at any time during the month."8
Also, "[c]overage is available for three months before the date of
application if [the applicant] would have been eligible [during
that time] had [he] applied.' Medical expenses covered by
Medicaid are listed in the Virginia Administrative Code and
include among other things: (1) inpatient hospital services; (2)
outpatient hospital services; (3) dental services; (4) physical
therapy; (5) prescription drugs; (6) laboratory and x-ray servic-
es; and (7) skilled nursing facility services. 1°
B. General Eligibility Requirements
For aged individuals," Medicaid eligibility is determined by
reference to certain income and resource levels. These financial
restrictions are based primarily on the size of the Medicaid
applicant's family.
cent of all nursing home residents wind up having their care at least partly paid for
by Medicaid, many after having exhausted their own funds." Id.
8. 12 VA. ADMIN. CODE 30-40-200(aX1) (1996) (formerly VRR 460-02-2.6100).
9. Id. 30-40-200(aX2) (1996) (formerly VRR 460-02-2.6100).
10. See id. 30-50-10, -20 (Supp. 1997) (formerly VRR 460-02-3.1100); see also 42
C.F.R. §§ 440.1-.270 (1996).
11. Federal statute defines an "aged" individual as a person 65 years of age or
older. See 42 U.S.C.S. § 1396d(a)(iii) (Law Co-op. 1995).
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1. Income
To be eligible for Medicaid benefits, the applicant and his
family must usually have an annual income less than or equal
to the Federal Poverty Income Guidelines' (Poverty Guidelines)
income level for a family of the appropriate size.12 In Virginia,
however, an applicant with income greater than the cap value
is not necessarily ineligible. The Commonwealth is one of sever-
al states that permit applicants to "spend down" excess income
and remain Medicaid-eligible. In deciding income-eligibility, the
Department of Medical Assistance Services"3 (DMAS) will de-
duct from the applicant's income the following amounts: (1) any
Supplemental Secured Income (SSI) benefits received by the
applicant, (2) any state supplement recognized by the Social
Security Act, 4 (3) any increases in Old Age, Survivors' and
Disability Insurance (OASDI), and (4) any expenses incurred
"for necessary medical and remedial services recognized under
State law."" These "spend-down" provisions essentially permit
an applicant to remain eligible for Medicaid benefits as long as
he spends any income he receives in excess of the cap on neces-
sary medical care.
2. Resources
Eligible Medicaid applicants must also meet certain resource
requirements. To be eligible for Medicaid benefits, a person or
his family may not hold more than a certain amount of count-
able assets. 6 In calculating these assets, DMAS considers only
12. The Federal Poverty Income Guidelines are increased annually and published
in the Federal Register. For 1997, the Poverty Guidelines income level for a single
person is $7,890; for a married couple, the figure is $10,610. 62 Fed. Reg. 10,856,
10,857 (1997).
13. Federal law and regulations require each state to establish a body to adminis-
ter the Medicaid program. See 42 U.S.C.S. 1396a(aX10) (Law. Co-op. 1995 & Supp.
1997). In Virginia, the Department of Medical Assistance Services is entrusted with
this task. See VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-321.1, -323 (Repl. Vol. 1997).
14. See 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 1396-1397(e) (Law. Co-op. 1995 & Cum. Supp. 1997).
15. 12 VA. ADMIN. CODE 30-40-130(b) (1996) (formerly VRR 460-02-2.6100).
16. Virginia Code section 32.1-325.02 describes the determination of an applicants
assets:
When determining eligibility for medical assistance services, 'assets"
means, in regard to an individual, all income and resources of the indi-
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those resources deemed "available"7 to the applicant and his
family and "considers only the resources of spouses living in the
same household as available to spouses." 8
The methods used by the DMAS to determine countable re-
sources are detailed in the Virginia Administrative Code. Not
all of an applicant's assets will be counted; certain assets are
entirely exempt from consideration. In Virginia, exempt proper-
ty includes: (1) the applicant's home; 9 (2) the applicant's auto-
mobile;S0 and (3) the applicant's burial plot if the value of that
plot is sufficiently low.2'
C. Spousal Impoverishment Provisions
Different eligibility guidelines apply when the institutional-
ization of the Medicaid applicant separates a married couple.
These "spousal impoverishment" provisions provide for the
vidual and the individual's spouse, including, but not limited to, any
income or resources which the individual or such individual's spouse is or
becomes entitled to, but does not receive, because of any action by such
individual or such individual's spouse, or by a person, including a court
or administrative body, with legal authority to act in the place of or on
behalf of the individual or such individual's spouse, or by any person,
including any court or administrative body acting at the direction of or
upon the request of the individual or such individual's spouse.
VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-325.02(A) (Repl. Vol. 1997).
17. Federal law directs each state to consider "only such income and resources as
are ... available to the applicant." 42 U.S.C.S. § 1396a(a)(17XB) (Law. Co-op. 1995).
Applicants and beneficiaries may, however, be required to use any resources due to
them but not yet recovered. See 42 C.F.R. § 435.608 (1996).
18. 12 VA. ADMIN. CODE 30-40-140(b) (Cum. Supp. 1997) (formerly VRR 460-02-
2.6100).
19. See id. 30-40-240(BX3) (1996) (formerly VRR 460-03-2.6105). The applicant's
home is defined as "the house and lot used as the principal residence." Id.; see also
VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-325(AX3) (Repl. Vol. 1997). Additionally, $5,000 worth of land
contiguous to the home is exempt from resource calculations. See 12 VA. ADMIN.
CODE 30-40-240(B)(3) (1996) (formerly VRR 460-03-2.6105); see also VA. CODE ANN. §
32.1-325(AX3) (Repl. Vol. 1997).
20. See 12 VA. ADMIN. CODE 30-40-290(4) (1996) (formerly VRR 460-03-2.6108.2).
The applicant may exclude one automobile from the resource calculation. If the appli-
cant owns more than one vehicle, "the individual's equity in the least valuable vehicle
or vehicles must be counted." Id.
21. See id. 30-40-290(1) (1996) (formerly VRR 460-03-2.6108.2). A burial plot for
the applicant worth $2,500 or less and a similarly valued burial plot for the
applicant's spouse are also exempt from resource eligibility consideration. See id.; VA.
CODE ANN. § 32.1-325(AX2) (Repl. Vol. 1997).
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applicant's spouse during an applicant's lengthy hospitalization.
These provisions apply to "[p]ersons whose first continuous
period of institutionalization [or a period of re-institutionaliza-
tion] began on or after September 30, 1989."' A "continuous
period of institutionalization" is defined in the Virginia Admin-
istrative Code as "30 consecutive days of institutional care in a
medical institution or nursing facility, or 30 consecutive days of
receipt of waiver services, or 30 consecutive days of a combina-
tion of institutional and waiver services."'
1. Modified Resource Eligibility Test
Under the spousal impoverishment provisions, an institution-
alized applicant is eligible for Medicaid benefits "if the differ-
ence between the couple's combined countable resources and the
community spouse resource allowance ... is equal to or less
than the appropriate Medicaid resource limit for one person."'
The community spouse resource allowance means the difference
between a couple's countable resources and the largest of the
following: (1) the spousal share of the resources; (2) the
spousal resource standard;" (3) any amount transferred by the
applicant to his spouse pursuant to a court order;27 or (4) an
amount determined by the DMAS hearing officer."
Like the general eligibility requirements, the spousal impov-
erishment provisions provide that certain assets are exempt
from resource-eligibility consideration. In calculating countable
22. 12 VA. ADmIN. CODE 30-110-730 (Cum. Supp. 1997) (formerly VRR 460-04-8.6
§ 2.1).
23. Id. 30-110-720 (Cum. Supp. 1997) (formerly VRR 460-04-8.6 § 1.1); see also 42
U.S.C.S. § 1396p(eX3) (Law Co-op. Supp. 1997) (defining "institutionalized individua).
24. 12 VA. ADMIN. CODE 30-110-800 (Cum. Supp. 1997) (formerly VRR 460-04-8.6
§ 2.8).
25. See id. 30-110-720 (Cum. Supp. 1997) (formerly VRR 460-04-8.6 § 1.1).
"Spousal share" is defined as one-half of the couple's countable resources at the be-
ginning of the most recent continuous period of care. See id. (defining "spousal
share"). This figure is "increased [each year] by the same percentage as the percent-
age increase in the consumer price index for all urban consumers (all items; U.S. city
average) between September 1988 and the September before the calendar year in-
volved.&" Id. (defining "community spouse resource allowance").
26. See id. This figure is also increased annually by reference to the consumer
price index. See id.
27. See id.
28. See id.
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resources under these provisions, the applicant's home, contigu-
ous property, household goods, and a single automobile are not
considered.' Additionally, if the institutionalized Medicaid ap-
plicant has resources that exceed the resource limit for a single
person, the DMAS will deduct the following amounts from the
applicant's resources for the purpose of establishing eligibility:
(1) the value of any resources the institutionalized spouse
transferred to the community spouse or to other dependents
pursuant to a court support order, (2) the value of any support
rights assigned to the Commonwealth, (3) the value of any
support rights that may not be assigned to the Commonwealth
due to the applicant's incompetency, and (4) any amount neces-
sary to make the individual eligible if the DMAS determines
that denial of Medicaid would create an undue hardship.
2. Income Considerations
Once the initial eligibility of the applicant is established, the
spousal impoverishment provisions determine how much the
Medicaid beneficiary must contribute to institutional care or
waiver services."' The Virginia Administrative Code details the
method by which the DMAS calculates the income of the insti-
tutionalized spouse. Unless shown otherwise, the DMAS consid-
ers income paid to one spouse as belonging only to that
spouse.32 Each spouse also owns one-half of all income paid to
the couple jointly' and one-half of any income "which has no
instrument establishing ownership."' Additionally, "[i]ncome
paid in the name of either spouse, or both spouses and at least
one other party, shall be considered available to each spouse in
a proportionate share."5 If the income is derived from property
held in trust, each spouse owns the income according to the
29. See id. (defining "countable resources").
30. See id. 30-110-830 (Cum. Supp. 1997) (formerly VRR 460-04-8.6 § 2.11).
31. See id. 30-110-920 (1996) (formerly VRR 460-04-8.6 § 3.1). "Waiver services" is
defined as Medicaid reimbursed home or community-based services. See id. 30-110-720
(Cum. Supp. 1997) (formerly VRR 460-04-8.6 § 1.1).
32. See id. 30-110-930(1)(a) (1996) (formerly VRR 460-04-8.6 § 3.2).
33. See id. 30-110-930(1)(b) (1996) (formerly VRR 460-04-8.6 § 3.2).
34. Id. 30-110-930(1)(c) (1996) (formerly VRR 460-04-8.6 § 3.2).
35. Id. 30-110-930(1)(d) (1996) (formerly VRR 460-04-8.6 § 3.2).
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terms of the trust instrument."5 Where the trust instrument is
not so specific, the rules detailed above for non-trust income
apply.3
7
In calculating the institutionalized beneficiary's income,
DMAS deducts a monthly thirty-dollar personal needs allow-
ance, a community spouse maintenance allowance, and a family
maintenance allowance.38 The community spouse maintenance
allowance is equal to the greatest of the following: (1) a per-
centage of the Federal Poverty Guidelines income level for
two" plus the excess shelter allowance, 4 (2) an amount set
in a spousal support court order,41 or (3) any amount "deter-
mined necessary by a [DMAS] hearing officer because of excep-
tional circumstances resulting in extreme financial duress."2
These deductions, however, are not made "when the allowances
are not actually made available to the community spouse.'
The family member's maintenance needs allowance is equal to
one-third of the amount for the community spouse (without re-
gard to excess shelter allowances), reduced by the monthly
income of the family member."
III. PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS BEFORE THE KASSEBAUM-
KENNEDY HEALTH REFORM BILL
A. Pre-application Transfer of Assets
To ensure Medicaid eligibility, an individual may wish to
transfer certain resources to friends or family members. While
36. See id. 30-110-930(2Xa) (1996) (formerly VRR 460-04-8.6 § 3.2).
37. See id. 30-110-930(2Xb) (1996) (formerly VRR 460-04-8.6 § 3.2).
38. See id. 30-110-950 (Cum. Supp. 1997) (formerly VRR 460-04-8.6 § 3.4).
39. This value is calculated as the applicable percentage of 1/12 of the income
level for a family of two. See id. 30-110-720 (Cum. Supp. 1997) (formerly VRR 460-04-
8.6 § 1.1) (defining "community spouse maintenance needs allowance").
40. See id. 30-110-960(AX1) (Cum. Supp. 1997) (formerly VRR 460-04-8.6 § 3.5).
The excess shelter allowance is "the actual monthly expense of maintaining the com-
munity spouse's residence that exceeds 30% of the community spouse maintenance
needs allowance," with some additional limitations. Id. 30-110-720 (Cum. Supp. 1997)
(formerly VRR 460-04-8.6 § 1.1) (defining "excess shelter allowance").
41. See id. 30-110-960(AX2) (Cum. Supp. 1997) (formerly VRR 460-04-8.6 § 3.5).
42. Id. 30-110-960(AX3) (Cum. Supp. 1997) (formerly VRR 460-04-8.6 § 3.5).
43. Id. 30-110-960(B) (Cure. Supp. 1997) (formerly VRR 460-04-8.6 § 3.5).
44. See id. 30-110-970(A) (1996) (formerly VRR 460-04-8.6 § 3.6).
13091997]
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this course of action may permit the applicant to meet
Medicaid's resource eligibility requirements, it may also result
in denial of eligibility for a period of time.45
1. Look-Back Date
The look-back date is the date thirty-six months before "the
first date as of which the individual both is an institutionalized
individual and has applied for medical assistance"46 and marks
the beginning of the look-back period. Any transfer of assets for
less than fair market value, made by the applicant or his
spouse, during this period may result in a period of ineligibility
for Medicaid benefits.47 Transfers before the look-back date are
ignored.
2. Length of Ineligibility
The ineligibility period resulting from a transfer of resources
for less than fair market value begins on the first day of the
first month during or after the transfer." The length of time
the Medicaid applicant remains ineligible
shall be equal to but shall not exceed the number of
months derived by dividing... It]he total, cumulative un-
compensated value of all assets transferred [during the
look-back period] by... [t]he average monthly cost to a
private patient of nursing facility services in the Common-
wealth at the time of application for medical assistance.49
45. See id. 30-40-300(E)(2) (1996) (formerly VRR 460-03-2.6109). This course of
action may also subject the applicant's attorney to criminal penalties. See discussion
infra Part IV.
46. 12 VA. ADMIN. CODE 30-40-300(EX2)(b) (1996) (formerly VRR 450-03-2.6109).
The look-back period is sixty months in the case of "payments from a trust or por-
tions of a trust that are treated as assets disposed of by the individual." Id.
47. See id. 30-40-300(EX2) (1996) (formerly VRR-460-03-2.6109).
48. See id. 30-40-300(EX2Xa) (1996) (formerly VRR 460-03-2.6109).
49. Id.
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3. Exempted Transfers
Certain enumerated transfers will not result in an applicant's
ineligibility for Medicaid benefits." Specifically, the applicant
may, without penalty, transfer his home to either: (1) his
spouse; (2) any of his children who are under the age of twen-
ty-one, blind, or disabled; (3) a sibling "who has an equity in-
terest in the home and who was residing in the individual's
home for a period of at least one year immediately before the
date the individual becomes an institutionalized individual;" or
(4) any of his children who were residing in the applicant's
home for at least two years immediately before the date of the
applicant's institutionalization and "who provided care to the
individual which permitted the individual to reside at home."
51
Also, transfers to or from the Medicaid applicant's spouse for
the sole benefit of that spouse will not result in a period of
ineligibility.52 An individual may transfer resources to his child
who is under the age of twenty-one or disabled, for the sole
benefit of that child, without suffering a loss of eligibility.'
Further, transfers to a trust established solely for the benefit of
a disabled person under the age of sixty-five are exempt."
B. Liens and Estate Recoveries
Although federal law permits states to do so, Virginia does
not impose liens against a Medicaid beneficiary's property to
ensure recovery of correctly paid Medicaid claims.55 The Com-
monwealth does, however, seek recovery from the estate of the
applicant under the federal guidelines.'
Federal regulations permit the DMAS to "make an adjust-
ment or recover funds for Medicaid claims correctly paid for an
50. See id. 30-40-300(EX2Xc) (1996) (formerly VRR 460-03-2.6109).
51. Id. 30-40-300(EX2XcX1) (1996) (formerly VRR 460-03-2.6109).
52. See id. 30-40-300(EX2XcX2Xa), (b) (1996) (formerly VRR 460-03-2.6109).
53. See id. 30-40-300(EX2XcX2Xc) (1996) (formerly VRR 460-03-2.6109).
54. See id. 30-40-300(EX2XcX2Xd) (1996) (formerly VRR 460-03-2.6109).
55. See id. 30-10-560 (Cum. Supp. 1997) (formerly VRR 460-01-53, VRR 460-01-
53.1).
56. See VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-327 (Repl. Vol. 1997); 12 VA. ADMIN. CODE 30-10-
560(A) (Cum. Supp. 1997) (formerly VRR 460-01-53, VRR 460-01-53.1).
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individual" from the estate of a Medicaid beneficiary, with cer-
tain restrictions. 7 The DMAS may recover from the estate of
any Medicaid beneficiary who received benefits when he was
sixty-five years or older after the death of the beneficiary's
spouse, and only when the beneficiary has no surviving children
who are under the age of twenty-one, blind, or disabled.'
C. Planning Strategies
Planning strategies to ensure Medicaid eligibility for an aged
client can be divided into three distinct categories. The first
category of strategies encompasses all actions designed to main-
tain exempt assets, such as the applicant's home. The second
category is conversion, including all strategies by which the
Medicaid applicant converts non-exempt assets to exempt assets
for the purpose of ensuring eligibility. The third category in-
cludes all transfers of assets, including those transfers which
may result in a period of ineligibility for benefits.
1. Maintenance of Exempt Assets
The maintenance of exempt assets is particularly important
in cases where the Medicaid applicant is institutionalized. In
those situations, the "[clontinued exemption of a residence
owned by an institutionalized person depends on evidence of 'an
intention to return' to the residence once institutionalized care
has begun."59 The homeowner may satisfy this requirement by
signing a written statement of his intent to return to the
residence.'
57. 42 C.F.R. § 433.36(h) (1996).
58. See id.
59. James D. Palmer, Jr., New Planning Approaches to Cope With Stricter Medic-
aid Rules, 23 EST. PLAN. 76, 76 (1996) (citations omitted).
60. See id.
1312
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2. Conversion
By converting non-exempt assets to exempt assets,61 the
Medicaid applicant may reduce his family's countable resources
and ensure his eligibility for Medicaid benefits. The conversion
may be performed by using non-exempt resources to either: (1)
pay off a mortgage or loan on another exempt resource or (2) to
purchase a new exempt asset.
a. Loan Pay-Offs
Paying off an existing mortgage is perhaps the simplest and
most common conversion method. Consider the following scenar-
io: an applicant and his spouse own a $250,000 home with
$150,000 in equity. They have $100,000 in cash assets. The
applicant would be ineligible for Medicaid benefits because the
couple's countable resourcesP' exceed the appropriate resource
level. However, if the couple spends $80,000 to pay off part of
the remaining mortgage on their home, their countable resourc-
es are reduced to $20,000 and the applicant is Medicaid-eligible.
This planning strategy, while set here in the context of a home
mortgage, can be used equally well with any other exempt
assets.
b. Purchases
A Medicaid applicant may also reduce his resources to ensure
Medicaid eligibility by using non-exempt assets to purchase
exempt assets. For example, an applicant with $100,000 in cash
assets and no home may wish to spend the money on a house,
thereby reducing his countable resources and gaining a
valuable, exempt asset.
61. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
62. The couple's countable resources consist only of the $100,000 in cash assets,
as the home is exempt from consideration. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying
text
1997] 1313
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An applicant may also convert cash assets by purchasing an
annuity. This purchase may invoke the Medicaid provisions
regarding trusts, but "[ain annuity is considered a trust only to
the extent that the Secretary of Health and Human Services
specifies. To date, the Secretary has not indicated that the trust
rules apply to annuities."' The Health Care Financing Agency
(HCFA), however, has published guidelines for the use of
annuities." These guidelines require that annuities not be
guaranteed for a period longer than the actuarial life expectan-
cy of the recipient.65 If the annuity is guaranteed for a longer
period, the total value of the payments made past the actuarial
life expectancy of the recipient represents a transfer for less
than fair market value, and may result in a period of ineligi-
bility." Although the use of an annuity may reduce the
applicant's resources to ensure Medicaid-eligibility, the income
stream provided by the annuity will be considered under
Medicaid's income provisions.
3. Transfers
An applicant may also reduce his countable resources by
transferring assets. However, few transfers are free of restric-
tions and most result in a period of ineligibility.67
a. Exempted Transfers
The Medicaid provisions permit an applicant to transfer cer-
tain assets without penalty. An applicant may transfer his
home to certain enumerated individuals without suffering a
period of ineligibility for benefits.' Usually, the applicant's
home is an exempt asset for the purposes of determining eligi-
bility for Medicaid.69 Where the applicaiit is institutionalized,
63. Joan Lensky Robert & Charles Robert, Planning for Disability Helps Preserve
a Client's Assets, 23 EST. PLAN. 311, 318 (1996) (citations omitted).
64. See Palmer, supra note 59, at 77.
65. See id (citing HCFA State Medicaid Manual Transmittal No. 64, § 3258.9
(Dec. 13, 1994)).
66. See id.
67. See supra notes 45-54 and accompanying text.
68. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
69. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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however, his home is exempt only if the noninstitutionalized
spouse still resides there.7" Consider this scenario: a Medicaid
beneficiary is institutionalized while his spouse lives in their
jointly owned home. The home is therefore exempt from eligi-
bility consideration. If, however, the noninstitutionalized spouse
predeceases the applicant and the applicant is the decedent-
spouse's sole beneficiary, the beneficiary-spouse has gained a
valuable resource that may make him ineligible for Medicaid
benefits.71 The solution is to transfer the beneficiary's share of
the home to the noninstitutionalized spouse and to ensure that
the noninstitutionalized spouse's will leaves nothing to the
institutionalized spouse. Then, if the noninstitutionalized spouse
predeceases the Medicaid beneficiary, the beneficiary will gain
no assets that will make him ineligible for coverage."
b. The Rule of Halves
The "rule of halves," or the Half-a-Loaf Theory, has been
used by attorneys to determine how much a Medicaid applicant
may transfer and still minimize the applicant's period of ineligi-
bility for benefits. 3 Under this theory, the applicant may
transfer half or more of his assets to "accelerate Medicaid [eligi-
bility] and preserve assets for loved ones." ' As an example of
this strategy, consider the following:
Mr. Jones has $100,000 in assets and is about to enter a
nursing home that costs $6,000 per month. If the average
cost of a nursing home in the community is $5,000 monthly,
a gift of $100,000 to Mr. Jones's daughter would render him
ineligible for Medicaid for 20 months (this is computed by
dividing the amount of assets transferred by the average
cost of a nursing home). If, however, Mr. Jones were to give
half of the $100,000, or $50,000, to his daughter, the result-
ing ineligibility period would be only ten months .... To
cover the cost of ten months of nursing home care that Mr.
Jones will pay privately, he would use the remaining
70. See 42 U.S.C.S. § 1396p(aX2) (Law. Co-op. 1995).
71. See Robert & Robert, supra note 64, at 316.
72. This technique of transferring the beneficiary's assets to the spouse works
with any valuable asset.
73. See Robert & Robert, supra note 63, at 316.
74. Id.
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$50,000 that he did not transfer to his daughter, as well as
his Social Security income of $1,000 per month. At the end
of the ten-month ineligibility period, Mr. Jones would prop-
erly be accepted for Medicaid."
c. The Salzman Formula
More efficient transfer strategies may be developed by using
a formula developed by Ira Salzman, an elder law practitioner
in New York City.7' While the Rule of Halves crudely approxi-
mates the amount an applicant may safely transfer to minimize
Medicaid ineligibility, it fails to take into account the client's
income, the actual cost of institutional care, or the actual living
expenses of the noninstitutionalized spouse." These factors are
accounted for in the Salzman Formula: AX + BX = C, where:
A is the average private pay monthly cost of nursing home
care in the client's state or community;
B is the cost of the client's nursing home plus other living
expenses (including those of a spouse living at home, if any)
less the client's income (including the income of a spouse
living at home, if any);
C is the client's excess resources over and above the Medic-
aid resource limit (and the spouse's community spouse re-
source allowance if there is a community spouse); and
X is the number of months that the client must pay for
nursing home care privately before becoming eligible for
Medicaid.
Thus, AX is the maximum amount that could be safely
transferred, and BX is the amount of savings the client
would have to pay for his care during the period of ineligi-
bility resulting from that transfer.78
75. Id.
76. See Formula to Calculate Medicaid Asset Transfers Still Works, THE ELDER L.
REP., Sept. 1994, at 10.
77. See id.
78. Id.
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Where A is equal to B, the formula gives the same result as
the Rule of Halves. Considering again the example above, Mr.
Jones has $100,000 in excess resources (C = $100,000). The
average monthly cost of institutional care in his community is
$5,000 (A = $5,000) and his nursing home care costs $6,000 per
month (B = $6,000 - $1,000 income = $5,000). Solving the equa-
tion for X, we see that X is equal to 10 months. The maximum
amount Mr. Jones can safely transfer, therefore, is $50,000.
Let's suppose, however, that the monthly cost of Mr. Jones'
institutional care is $7,000 (B now equals $6,000). The Rule of
Halves would still indicate that Mr. Jones may safely transfer
$50,000. Using the Salzman Formula, however, we see that the
amount that Mr. Jones can safely transfer, "AX" is actually
$45,450.
IV. RECENT LEGISLATIVE CHANGES TO THE FEDERAL
STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
The Kennedy-Kassebaum health reform bill was signed into
law by President Clinton on August 20, 1996,"° and became
effective on January 1, 1997.' The bill created "a new crime
for people who knowingly dispose of their assets to qualify for
Medicaid benefits.""1 The provision attached criminal liability
not only to those seeking Medicaid but to their lawyers as well.
Congress amended this section again when it passed the
Balanced Budget Act of 1997.2 It now focuses on attorneys
and financial planners and does not impose criminal penalties
on the client whose funds or assets are being transferred.'
79. See Harry S. Margolis, Congress Criminalizes Asset Transfers, THE ELDER L.
REP., Sept. 1996, at 1.
80. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-191, § 218, 110 Stat. 2008, 2009 (1996).
81. 142 CoNG. REC. H9776-01 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1996) (statement of Rep. Ganske).
"Part of the impetus for the fresh crackdown comes from the states which are unhap-
py that one-third of spending on Medicaid, a program intended for the poor, goes for
nursing home care-much of it for middle-class Americans." Meyer, supra note 6, at
34.
82. See Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 4734, 111 Stat. 251, 522-23 (1997).
83. It has been noted that the statute and its August 5, 1997 amendment, may
violate the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Kenneth J.
Rampino, Transfer of Assets to Qualify for Medicaid May Result in Criminal Liability
Under "Kassebaum-Kennedy" Bill, EsT. PLANNER'S ALERT, Oct. 1996, at 1, 2. Addition-
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The relevant provision of this enactment became effective on
August 5, 1997, 4 and imposes criminal penalties upon whoev-
er:
for a fee knowingly and willfully counsels or assists an
individual to dispose of assets (including by any transfer in
trust) in order for the individual to become eligible for med-
ical assistance under a State plan under title XIX, if dispos-
ing of the assets results in the imposition of a period of
ineligibility for such assistance under section 1917(c).'
The new law amends the subsection by striking "failure, or
conversion by any other person" and inserting: "failure, con-
version, or provision of counsel or assistance by any other
person.""6
The original provision and its most recent amendment clearly
seek to limit the transfer of assets to obtain Medicaid eligi-
bility. The August 1997 amendment clearly demonstrates con-
gressional intent to target attorneys, financial planners, and
others who counsel an elderly applicant to make prohibited
transfers. 7
ally, two elements of the criminalization of ineligibility-producing transfers may be in-
herently vague and therefore void. See id. The first of these elements deals with "the
scienter which must be established by the government." Id. The second, and most
troubling, element is that criminal liability is based upon an actual disqualification
for Medicaid benefits. Thus, "tirhe crime cannot be established without a determina-
tion of an administrative body applying the complex rules codified in the Social Secu-
rity Act ... as interpreted by HCFA and the particular state administrative body
having jurisdiction over the matter," all of which may occur months or years after
the transfer occurred. Id. at 3. A more detailed discussion of constitutional issues
implicated by the statute is beyond the scope of this article. Thus, we assume the
statute effectively criminalizes those transfers which will result in Medicaid ineligibil-
ity.
84. See Pub. L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251 (1997).
85. Id. § 4734, 111 Stat. at 522-23.
86. Id.
87. This amendment confirms the vision of those who asserted that the Kennedy-
Kassebaum bill was intended to target attorneys and financial planners because of
the difficulties associated with prosecuting an elderly applicant. See Marian Raab,
Medicaid Planners May Encounter Jail Time, FIN. PLAN., Nov. 1, 1996, at 18.
1318
MEDICAID ELIGIBILITY PLANNING
A. Strategies Unaffected by the Changes
Some planning strategies remain unaffected by these recent
congressional enactments. Under the new law, planning strate-
gies that do not require the transfer of assets impose no crim-
inal liability. Thus, an attorney is free to counsel an applicant
to convert non-exempt assets to exempt assets by spending cash
to pay off an existing loan or to purchase an immediate annu-
ity." Additionally, since the new law does not criminalize
transfers which will not result in a period of ineligibility, an
attorney is free to counsel an applicant on any planning strate-
gies that rely on exempt transfers. Thus, the applicant may
transfer his property to his spouse, his home to certain enu-
merated individuals,89 or any of his property for fair market
value without worrying about criminal penalties for his coun-
sel.90 Additionally, an applicant is probably safe in transferring
assets and then "waiting out" the look-back period before ap-
plying for Medicaid benefits.9
B. Planning Strategies Criminalized by the Bill
The new statute seems to criminalhze any transfers that (1)
are made, in whole or in part, for the purposes of ensuring
Medicaid-eligibility and (2) that actually result in a period of
ineligibility.' Thus, use of the Rule of Halves and Salzman's
Formula are ill-advised under the new statute;9 3 in fact, any
88. This applies only so long as that annuity makes no payments beyond the
actuarial life expectancy of the applicant. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying
text.
89. See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
90. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
91. See Margolis, supra note 79, at 2.
92. But see id. at 1 (arguing that, under some interpretations of the provision,,
the imposition of a period of ineligibility occurs upon transfer and, therefore, "any
transfer that may have as a purpose eventual eligibility for Medicaid may be crimi-
nal" regardless of whether the transfer actually results in ineligibility); Donald S.
Hecht, Letter to the Editor, Law's Full Quotation Changes Meaning, N.Y. L.J., Oct.
16, 1996, at 2 (arguing that no transfer imposes criminal liability unless accompanied
by "a statement, representation, concealment, failure or conversion" under 42 U.S.C. §
1320a-7b(a)).
93. The criminal provisions discussed herein seem to have been designed to elimi-
nate the use of these techniques. See Rampino, supra note 83, at 2-3.
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non-exempt transfer for less than market value, within the
look-back period, may result in a criminal penalty."
Under the present state of the law, an attorney who counsels
a client to transfer assets causing a period of ineligibility, and
whose client, or his spouse, applies for Medicaid during that
period of ineligibility, has committed a misdemeanor punishable
by a fine of up to $10,000 and up to twelve months in
prison.9"
C. Curing Criminal Conduct
Section 1396p(c)(2)(C)(iii) of U.S. Code Title 42 states that an
individual shall not be ineligible for medical assistance to the
extent that "all assets transferred for less than fair market
value have been returned to the individual." Thus, it appears
that the criminal action defined by the amendment may be
"cured" if transferred assets are returned to the transferor."
The section does not state when this cure must occur so per-
haps a client may recover the transferred assets even after a
period of ineligibility has been imposed and criminal liability
against the attorney has attached."
V. CONCLUSION
The Medicaid program's statutory and regulatory framework
represents one of the most complex in American law. This legal
labyrinth may be navigated by skilled attorneys and planners
to provide clients with strategies to ensure eligibility while
protecting assets.
94. See Margolis, supra note 79, at 2. Certainly the new criminal provision must
be considered during any estate planning. "There are several sound reasons for asset
re-distribution, including taxation, probate avoidance and asset management ....
[Now] the implications of 'ennedy-Kassebaum' [and its amendment] must be factored
into the equation." Rampino, supra note 83, at 3.
95. See 42 U.S.C.S. § 1320a-7b(aX6Xii) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997); Margolis, supra
note 81, at 2.
96. 42 U.S.C.S. § 1396p(cX2XCXiii) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).
97. See Margolis, supra note 79, at 2.
98. See id.
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The effects of legislative changes are difficult to describe
conclusively. The statute itself faces significant constitutional
challenges and the poor drafting makes definite interpretation
impossible. No one can definitely outline which actions attor-
neys may safely undertake under the new law, but, under the
law's most reasonable interpretation, attorneys may safely:
(1) counsel clients to transfer assets for fair market value;
(2) counsel clients to transfer assets to a spouse, child under
the age of twenty-one, or, in trust, to a disabled person under
the age of sixty-five for the sole benefit of the recipient;
(3) counsel clients to transfer their homes to certain enumer-
ated individuals (i.e., their spouses); and
(4) counsel clients to transfer any assets, provided that the
client is willing to "wait out" the thirty-six or sixty month look-
back period before applying for Medicaid benefits.99
An attorney who suggests that a client transfer assets in
ways other than these may find that he faces criminal liability
for his conduct. Thus, attorneys practicing in this area are
advised to be wary; ideally, an attorney should "[a]dvise all
clients in all cases of all transfers ... [and e]ncourage long-
term care planning and consider Medicaid only as a last re-
sort."0
0
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